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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RIO GRANDE MOTORWAY, INC. 
Appellant, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, MILLY 0. BERNARD, OLOF E. 
ZUNDELL, and KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
Commissioners of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah, 
and UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15156 
Petition of respondent, Uintah Freightways (hereinafter 
referred to as Uintah) to provide direct motor carrier service from 
Salt Lake City to Price, Utah on the theory of an alternate route 
deviation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER TRIBUNAL 
The Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Commission") granted respondent's petition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks the court to reverse and set aside the order 
of the Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1958, respondent received certificate of convenience and Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Fu ding for digitization provided by the Institute of Mus um and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
necessity 1288 from thp Cornrnic,si.011 IP. g)l a11tho~·i~inq it to 
ooerate 
as a common carriPr in intl"ac,tatp cnnm1PrCP. The cPrtificate is 
rouchPd in thn•e suhoaraqranhs. \·1ith reslrirtions not here nertinent_ 
"s fo 11 ows: 
(A) Between Salt Lake City, ~!tah illld all ooi!1ts vii thin 
the Uintah Basin over U.S Highway 40 and other 
various Utah _State and County highways to all points 
within the Uintah Basin serving to, from and between 
all Uintah Basin points. 
(B) Between Vernal, Utiih and Price, Utah via Duschesne 
County, Utah serving Vernal, Utah and Price, Utah 
and all intermediate points. 
(C) Betv1een all points in Utah authorized in A and B 
above, on the one hand, and all points in Daggett 
County, Utah on the other. 
Respondent has provided no service from Salt Lake City~ 
Price since the issuance of the certificate in 1958 until May, 1976 
exceot for an occasional undefined and irrelevant "hot shot service.'' 
(T. l 0, 16) 
In May, 1976, the respondent, for the first time, began 
running schedules from Salt Lake City to Price via either U.S. High1·1ay 
40 to the junction of Utah Highway 33 at Duschesne and thence over 
Utah Highway 33 to Price or via U.S. Highway 91 from Salt Lake City, 
Utah to Provo, thence over U.S. Highway 189 to Heber and thence over 
U.S. Highway 40 to Ouschesne and over Utah Highway 33 to Price. 
Some three months later, on August 20, 1976, respondentiile: 
a petition with the Commission (R. 1) entitled "Petition to Deviate 
Over an Alternate Route," that route being U.S. Highway 50-6 between 
Provo and Castle Gate. 
· d "R" and References to the official record are desic1nilte d "T" 
references to the reporters transcript ~re des1gna~ 
-2-
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Tne cippl1cal1un was heard berore Lo111rn1ss1oner Olof E. 
i'unoe I ur1 ~e1ne111oer 22, 1976. Appe 11 ant and Asnworth Transfer appeared 
at the nearing in protest to the application. Subsequently the 
Con11111ss10n is:,ued it·s order granting the relief prayed for in the 
petitwn, authonzrng direct service from Salt Lake City to Price. 
(R. 78) Appropriate petitions for reconsideration were tiled and denied 
anu the aµpe I I ant is here before the Supreme Court seeking a reversal 
of the Co111111ission's order. 
ARGUMENT 
THE GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO UINTAH IN 1958 WAS A 
SINGLE GRANT AND THE COMPONANT PARTS THEREOF 
CANNOT BE "TACKED." 
II 
ANY SERVICE BY RESPONDENT FROM SALT LAKE CITY TO 
PRlCE IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY AND THEREFORE ILLEGAL. 
III 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE CIRCUITOUS ROUTE FROM 
SALT LAKE CITY TO PRICE IS NOT ILLEGAL, RESPONDENT 
HAS WHOLLY FAILED TO MEET IT'S BURDEN IN PROVING 
THAT THE PROPOSED "ALTERNATE ROUTE" SHOULD BE 
AUTHORIZED. 
IV 
THE COMM I SS ION ERRED IN IT'S APP LI CAT ION OF THE 
STATUTORY AND CASE LAW. 
Points I and II above will be argued jointly. 
Respondent's certificate 1288 is a single grant of authority, 
issued pur·suant to a single application in the single proceeding and 
consists of three parts designated (A) (B) and (C). Part (A) authorizes 
service between )alt Lake City, Utah and all points in the Uintah Basin. 
-3-
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Part (B) authorizes service between Vernal, Utah (in the Uintah 
Basin) and Price, Utah via Duschesne County. Part (C) authorizes 
service between the points authorized in parts (A) and (B) on the 
one hand and all points in Daggett County on the other, with 
restrictions not here pertinent. 
It was not until May, 1976, in obvious preparation for the 
petition under consideration here, that respondent, for the first time, 
instituted a service between Salt Lake City and Price, via Duschesne. 
Respondent argues that such a service is authorized by "tacking" its 
authorities under parts (A) and (B) of certificate 1288 at Duschesne. 
We contend that such an alleged "tacking" is patently without any 
authority whatever and is unlawful and illegal. 
Basic rules of construction and common sense dictate that 
the Cammi ss ion never intended to authorize such service. Obviously, 
service between Salt Lake City and Price was not part of the original 
application and no proof was adduced in support thereof. Had the 
Commission intended to authorize such service it would have been easy 
to do so in direct and specific terms. 
We are unable to find any guidelines in the Utah statutes 
or case law defining what authorities may or may not be tacked. ~~· 
the Interstate Commerce Commission has a long line of cases prohibitini 
the tacking of separate paragraphs of authorities issued in a single 
proceeding, except in unusual circumstances. 
In the case of Zirbel--Investigation of Operations, 35 M.C.L 
684; 8 F.C.C. 32, the Commission stated: 
"The right of a motor common carr~er: to. tack 
separate grants of unrestricted author1t1es is well 
settled regardless of whether the authorities 
involve regular routes, irregular routes, or a 
combination of both. 
-4-
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The question of what is a separate grant of 
irregular-route authority has been fully discussed 
and determined in several proceedings before this 
Com~ission. It is axioma~ic that only a single grant 
of irregular-route authority can eminate from one 
proceeding. It is not uncommon to describe such a 
single.or separate grant of irregular-route authority, 
in two or more paragraphs or parts in the 
certificate or permit subsequently issued." (emphasis added) 
Upon reconsideration of the Zirbel proceeding in 54 M.C.C. 
409; 9 F.C.C. 32,468 the above-stated finding was restated with 
approval. The Commission, again, in the case of Weigand, Inc., 
Modification of Certificate 114 M.C.C. 806; 1972 F.C.C. 36,600 quoted 
from and approved the finding in Zirbel, Supra. 
The position of the Interstate Commerce Commission was clearly 
set forth in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission vs. G. and M. 
Motor Transfer Company, Inc., 5 F.C.C. 80,251, United States District 
Court, Western District of North Carolina, Statesville, Division, April 
30, 1945; 64 F. Supp. 302,wherein the District Court upheld and adopted 
the following finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission: 
''It should be observed that operations are 
authorized (1) from Elkin and Statesville, N. C., 
to points in the District of Columbia and 11 
states, not including North Carolina, and (2) 
from the District of Columbia and the same 11 
states to points in North Carolina. There is no 
authority, for example, to operate from any point 
in New York to any point in Georgia. The certifi-
cate specified the service to be performed out-
bound from Elkin and Statesville and from points 
in the District of Columbia and 11 states to Elkin 
and Statesville and all other points in North 
Carolina .... The Authority granted is set forth 
in clear and unambiguous terms. As stated, 
applicant, however, would have us read into the 
certificate authority, for example, to transport a 
shipment from a New York point to a Georgia point 
by way of Statesville. It would do so apparently 
-5-
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on the theory that, since it has authority to 
operate from a point in inbound service to 
Statesville and in outbound service from States-
ville to a point in Georgia, it may, under the 
two separately stated authorities, interchange 
with itself and provide through service. 
Applicant's position is untenable. Plainly, 
Division 5 did not intend to grant dpplicant the 
authority it would have us find it contained in 
its certificate .... Nor is the interpretation 
requested warranted by the language of the certi-
ficate; rather, it would be contrary thereto. 
Section 208 (a) of the act provides that we shall 
specify in a certificate "the service to be ren-
dered" ... and in case of operations not over 
specified routes or between fixed termini, the 
territory within which the motor carrier is 
authorized to operate .... The words "to" and 
"from" in applicant's certificate define the 
territory in which it may operate. This terri-
tory may not be increased by the expedient of 
interpreting "to" and "from" a point to mean 
also through such point. If Division 5 had in-
tended to grant applicant that authority, it 
would have done so with more appropriate 
language. 
In this connection, we are unable to subscribe 
to the fiction of an interchange with oneself 
as authorizing an operation not otherwise au-
thorized .... Under the certificate it now 
holds, applicant is authorized to conduct only 
service from and to certain base points. By 
proper arrangements it may interchange with other 
carriers at any point which it is authorized to 
serve, and the same shipment may be both received 
from and delivered to any other carrier, but its 
service as to any particular shipment must either 
begin or end at one of the authorized base points . 
. . . We find no merit in applicant's 
petition, and it therefore will be denied." 
This case was cited with approval in Malone Freight Lines, 
Inc.--Investigation of Operations and Practices, 113 M.C.C. 442; 19ll 
-6-
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F.C.C. 36,542, wherein the Commission again stated the time-honored 
rule that "it is a basic principle that separate segments or 
paragraphs of a single grant of authority may not be combined." 
The reasons for describing different portions of a single 
grant of authority are many and varied and often present difficult 
questions of interpretation. See Daily Express, Inc. vs. United 
States of America, 342 F. Supp. 1295; 1972 F.C.C. 82,321. However, 
it is clear beyond question in the case under consideration that the 
Commission intended Parts A and B and C to be part of the single 
grant of authority issued in respondent's certificate of convenience 
and necessity 1288. As such, the alleged "tacking" is unauthorized 
and is illegal and cannot be the basis of the authority granted by 
the Commission. 
If respondent's theory and the decision of the Cormnission 
were allowed to become law the door would be flung wide open for 
wholesale evasion of motor carrier regulation in the State of Utah. 
For example, an applicant could seek authority from the Commission in 
a single application under Part (A) to transport general commodities 
from Salt Lake County to Simpson Springs in South Central Tooele 
County, near the Dugway Proving Grounds, and in Part (B) from Simpson 
Springs to all points in the State of Utah. Such an application would 
attract little, if any, attention inasmuch as there is no traffic moving 
from Salt Lake County to Simpson Springs and none from Simpson Springs 
to the balance of the State. Such an unopposed applicant could present 
testimony, real or illusory, from an optomistic and ambitious witness 
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indicating he planned to construct some type of facility at Simpson 
Springs which would require the transportation of inbound and 
outbound commodities. Once such an unopposed application ripened 
into a certificate the applicant could, following in Uintah's footste~· 
file an alternate route application asking that the Commission approve 
authority to provide transportation from all points in Salt Lake 
County directly to all points in the State of Utah. Under respondent', 
theory this would require no proof of public convenience and necessity 
because under such theory Parts (A) and ( B) of the application could 
be "tacked" and the resulting savings in mileage by the alternate 
route application would be all that would be required to give the 
fictional applicant state-wide service. A similar situation could 
exist by choosing any destination and origin point throughout the Stat< 
which would be so remote as to escape attention of existing potentiall1 
protesting carriers. Obviously such a precedent would lead to chaos 
rather than intelligent regulation. If the Public Service Commission 
had intended to authorize Uintah, in 1958, to provide service from 
Salt Lake City to Price via Duschesne, it would have been a simple 
matter to couch a grant of authority in those terms. 
The three parts of the single grant of authority issued in 
certificate 1288 cannot legally be tacked and for this reason a lone 
the decision of the Commission must be reversed. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission, in Falwell Fast Fr~ 
I~, 46 M.C.C. 804; 5 F.C.C. 31,093, aptly stated: 
"Thus applicant has no authorized rout~ betw~en 
Gauley Bridge and Charlottesville, which points 
are the termini of the alternate route requested 
-8-
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in No. MC-903 (Sub-No. 19). Clearly a carrier 
may not be granted an 'alternate' route between 
points as to which it presently has no 
authorized route. To do so would enable such a 
carrier to institute a new operation without a 
showing that it was required by the public con-
venience and necessity." 
However, the following argument presents a further and 
equally cogent reason which compels a reversal of the Commission's 
decision. 
III 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE CIRCUITOUS ROUTE FROM 
SALT LAKE CITY TO PRICE IS NOT ILLEGAL, RESPONDENT HAS 
WHOLLY FAILED TO MEET IT'S BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE 
PROPOSED "ALTERNATE ROUTE" SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED. 
We are unaware of any Supreme Court decision or statutory 
provision in the State of Utah specifically dealing witij the require-
ments covering an alternate route application. Respondent relies 
heavily upon the application of Palmer Brothers, Inc. in case 4869 
sub 1 issued by the Commission on May 14, 1962. In that case, Palmer 
was authorized specifically to transport commodities between Salt 
Lake City and Provo, Utah utilizing U.S. Highway 40 to Heber City and 
Utah Highway 189 to Provo, restricted against service to any of the 
intermediate points between Salt Lake City and Provo over the Heber 
route. Palmer was also authorized specifically to traverse U.S. Highway 
91 fully loaded between Salt Lake City and Provo enroute to the area of 
Delta and Fillmore. Upon Palmer's application to the Commission to 
amend it's certificate to substitute a direct route via U.S. Highway 
91 in lieu of the circuitous route via Heber City, the Commission 
properly granted the application upon the findings that Palmer was an 
effective competitor for traffic originating in Salt Lake City and 
destined to Provo; that it specifically held authority from Salt Lake 
- 9-
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City to Provo via the circuitous mute and upon the further finding 
that the granting of the authority wou·J d have no materially adverse 
effect upon the services of existing carriers. 
We have no quarrel whatever with the Commission's decision 11 
the Palmer case and submit that it applied the customary criteria to 0, 
used in an alternate route deviation case. We strongly contend, 
however, that Palmer Brothers is clearly distinguishable from the 
case at hand. Palmer had specific authority from the origin to the 
destination via the circuitous route. Uintah does not. Palmer was an 
effective competitor for the traffic from origin to destination. 
Uintah is not. The granting of the Palmer application did not impair 
the services of existing carriers. The granting of the instant 
application would seriously impair the services of existing carriers. 
There are a multitude of Interstate Commerce Commission 
decisions and court decisions which set forth alternate route guide-
lines in substantially the same ·language used by the Commission in 
Palmer. 
In the case of Michigan Express, Inc. Extension, 108 M.C.C. 
245; 1969 F.C.C. 36,273, the Interstate Commerce Commission set fortn 
the alternate route criteria as follows: 
" ... it is well established that to justify a 
grant of alternate route authority solely on th~ 
basis of operating economy and efficiency, applicant 
must show (1) that it is operating between the 
involved termini over a practicable and feasible . 
service route, (2) that it is an effective competitor 
with existing carriers for traffic moving between the 
termini and (3) that a grant of the authority sou~ht 
will not enable applicant to institute a new service 
or a service so different from that presently provided 
as to improve materially its competitive position." 
-10-
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stated: 
In denying the alternate route application, the Commission 
"However, applicant's operations between South 
Bend, Indiana, and the other-named Michigan points 
present a different situation. Protestants compete 
vigorously for and transport substantial volumes of 
traffic between these points, and applicant's 
participation in such traffic is, by volume, relatively 
small in comparison. It's unfavorable competitive 
position is, no doubt, due to the relatively high 
degree of circuity involved in observing Michigan 
City, Indiana, as a gateway in the case of truckload 
traffic, and in employing Chicago, Illinois, as a 
break-bulk point for less-than-truckload shipments. 
Because the proposed alternate route would reduce 
circuity by an average of over 20%, we believe that 
it's use in the transportation of this traffic would 
permit improvement in the applicant's service to a degree 
sufficient to constitute a new service which would 
work a detriment to existing carriers." 
It is seen from the above quotation and from the following 
language in Davidson Transfer and Storage Co. Extension--Alternate 
Routes, 91 M.C.C. 687; 15 F.C.C. 35,530, that the applicant has the 
burden of concurrently proving the three elements required to justify 
an alternate route. In Davidson, the Commission stated: 
"It is our opinion, however, that should 
applicant be allowed to operate over the proposed 
alternate route, it is probable that a considerable 
proportion of the Norfolk traffic would be diverted 
from the service route ... In our opinion this 
would permit applicant to institute a new service 
which would be significantly different from that 
presently provided and would materially improve 
applicant's competitive position to the detriment 
of existing carriers. Although we are sympathetic 
with applicant's desire to operate as efficiently 
and economically as possible, protestants are 
entitled, in a case of this type, to a showing 
that the use of the proposed alternate route will 
not materially change the competitive situation; 
there is no such showing. Under these circum-
stances, we conclude that the applicant has failed 
-11-
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to satisfy the required criteria and, conse-
quently, that the application should be denied." 
(emphasis added) 
In the instant case, the Public Service Commission wholly 
misconstrued the burden of proof upon the applicant and erroneously 
placed it upon protestants (appellant). On page 2 of it's order the 
Commission stated: 
"No evidence was adduced by the protestants 
at the time of the hearing to show that applicant 
was not an effective competition (sic) with them, 
nor did protestants demonstrate that there had been 
any adverse or decreased revenues or any other 
evidence of destructive competition by reason of 
the performance of the service by UINTAH FREIGHT-
WAYS." (emphasis added) 
The burden of proof is, of course, upon the applicant to 
show that it is an effective competitor and protestants are under no 
obligation whatever to supply this burden when the applicant fails to 
meet it. Furthermore, appe 11 ant contends that it's revenues have not 
been decreased by the operations of respondent from May until the 
hearing since the respondent was not an active competitor. 
An examination of the evidence adduced at the hearing~ 
respondent clearly shows it's failure to meet it's burden in this 
regard. 
The first burden upon the applicant is to show that it is 
operating between the involved termini over a practicable and 
feasible service route. The applicant's evidence shows that the 
service route between Salt Lake City and Price via Ouschesne is over 
Utah Highway 33 between Duschesne and Price which route is commonly 
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called "Indian Canyon." Indian Canyon is a difficult route in the 
wintertime and the road is often closed. (T. 9, 17) This route 
requires an additional 140 miles per round trip which results in a 
70% deviation over the direct route. The service route is also two 
hours longer one-way loaded in good weather and involves an undeter-
mined delay in bad weather which often results in a complete 
prohibition of the use of this route in wintertime. We respectfully 
submit that this evidence wholly fails to satisfy the applicant's 
burden that the circuitous route is indeed a practicable and feasible 
one. (T. 9, 10, 16-19) 
The second criteria which applicant must prove is that it 
is an effective competitor with existing carriers for'traffic moving 
between the termini. In this regard, the evidence of the applicant 
falls far short of meeting it's burden. The testimony of Mr. Smith 
representing the applicant indicates that a regular service was 
instituted in May, 1976 which operates once per day, five days per 
week. He stated that he had developed "some traffic" on this route 
since May, 1976. (T. 10, 11) No other testimony was given by 
applicant. The applicant wholly failed to establish the amount of 
traffic, if any, being handled in the newly instituted daily schedules. 
It wholly failed to show whether it was transporting any traffic at a 
profit. It wholly failed to show that it was a competitor of any kind 
let alone an "effective" competitor, notwithstanding the fact that it 
clearly has the burden of proving this element. Applicant was content 
to establish that it had recently operated over the alternate route 
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and nothing more. The Commission was clearly in error in it's 
finding that the protestants had failed to show that applicant was 
not an effective competitor. The burden is upon the applicant, not 
upon the protestant. 
The third element required to establish an alternate route 
case is that a grant of the authority sought wil 1 not enable applicant 
to institute a new service or a service so different from that 
presently provided as to materially improve it's competitive position. 
Mr. Smith testified in this regard as follows: 
"Q All right, sir. Have you made a calculation, sir, 
with respect to the miles that you are presently 
operating on your regular route service between 
Salt Lake City, and Price? 
A We have. 
Q What were your findings? 
A The present route that we are traveling requires 
us to traverse an additional 140 miles per round 
trip in excess of what we would be traversing if 
we had the route that we are requesting in this 
application. 
Q All right, sir. Have you calculated any advantages 
that might accrue to your company were you permitted 
to perform this service over a less circuitous 
routing. 
A 
Q 
Yes. There would be a savings of fuel in the 
amount of what we approximate to be 8,424 gallons 
per year. It would save us in man hour production 
in excess of three and a half hours per day for 
each day that we operate this. The savings in oil, 
tires, maintenance, and replacement parts and 
equipment we have not been able to calculate, but 
they're sizeable, and this route would be th~ most 
economi ca 1 , convenient way to serve the pub 11 c, and 
it would reduce the burden of the highways that 
we're traveling. 
Is there anything particularly unusual about ~he 
route that you are traveling at the pres~nt time 
with respect to the condition of those h1 ghways as 
it applies to year round service? 
-14-
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A In the win,1.ertnnte it's goin(} to.:be more difficult 
to serve th's area because of 1t~ tnounta'in known 
as Indian Ca"yon, which is between Duschesne and 
Castle Gate, ~hich is ;n excess :C1f 9,000' feet' 
and it's not 011e of tht primary highways that: s 
kept clear,.of i,~' . .and 50ow by the- Highway \' 
Depa,rtment, anu it wilt make it- incorweil-ient to 
travel' t~at way, and sooeti~s it• w·ifiomake it 
impassable, at 1-.hi ch time we' willr haver to petition 
the Commission fJr special temporary permits to 
use Highway 6 an<'. 50." (T. 9, 10) ... 
The evidence of appellant showsi that it operated during the 
first eight months of l9Z6 a,t a 99% 10perat.;ng -ratil\ eari1ing a net income 
_ If- -:: 1, ,, 1·,1 _1-J · 
of only $1,447.97 on an adjusted g0 oss revewe of $540,337.00. (R. ll) 
I ., ·r 
In this connection, Mr. Marsh, rep·esenting the appellant, testified: 
"Q 
'·(' \ :-_- -, ~ ( 
(By Mr. ~o~le) Mr;_rMarsh~ .thi11:-sho~s ttlat your 
operating ratio is %1 and that you had a net 
i ncome'._of less than Pi fteen. 1'tumtred dollars on 
a gross of over half a mill ion? 
1·.c 
A That's correct. 
u ~-,1) r ·, •1~, · 11 
Q You are sending three schedules per day to Salt Lake 
-City to Pric.e? , -, "-,- , ' · · 
A That's correct. 
Q Do you. a,lso have extra schedules?· · .':• 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes, we do. 
How often and how do yru handle those? 
On the average of two a-: three time!F a: week· we nave 
sometimes two or three txtra schedules, and we send 
those out as they come 1.p with extra drivers to 
Price to cover the load& 
What time do you run you· schedules? What tiTTl_e of 
day? 
Our normal schedules, oni leaves at ll:OO p.m. in 
the evening, two will le,ve at 12:01 a.m., and the 
rest will leave at 7:30 r.he·.fonow,ing morning. 
-15-
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Canyon would not in effect create a new service which respondent c~n~ 
now provide. The evidence shows, and common sense dictates, that if 
respondent can reduce it's mileage by 30%, save 8 ,424 ga 11 ons of fuel 
per year, save 3 1/2 hours per day in operational time, save 30% in oil, 
tires, maintenance and replacement parts and avoid wintertime ice, 
snow and road closures, it would put respondent in a new competitive 
position which it does not now enjoy. 
The Courts and the Commission have consistently held that 
the burden is upon the applicant to concurrently meet a 11 three tests 
enummerated above in order to qualify for a grant of alternate-route 
authority. The failure of applicant to meet any one of the three tests 
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is fatal to it's cause. Here the applicant has wholly failed to 
meet ~of the three tests and the order of the Commission granting 
the alternate-route application must be reversed. See Central Motor 
Lines--Alternate Routes, 1967 F.C.C. 36,157; Campbell Sixty-six vs. 
United States, 259 F. Supp. 529, 1966 F.C.C. 81,843; Michigan Express, 
Inc., Supra, and Davidson Transfer and Storage, Extension, Supra. 
IV 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE 
STATUTORY AND CASE LAW. 
We think the most orderly procedure in setting forth the 
errors committed by the Commission in it's order is to proceed 
chronologically with an examination of the provisions thereof. 
Reliance by the Commission on the case of Cantlay and Tanzola 
vs. Public Service Commission, 233 P. 2d 344 (in the middle of page 2 
of the order) (R. 78) is a good example of the misapplication of Utah 
law to the facts under consideration. The Cantlay and Tanzola case is 
entirely foreign to the factual situation presented here and the law 
enunciated therein has no application whatever to the problem at 
hand. 
That case involved an application for a contract carrier 
permit pursuant to Section 54-6-8 U.C.A. 1953, as amended (formerly 
76-5-21 U.C.A. 1943). In that case, the applicant (I. Sander, Inc.) 
already held a contract carrier permit to transport gasoline from Salt 
Lake City to Roosevelt where it deposited the gasoline in a bulk 
storage plant from which it transported gasoline in a small 1400 
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gallon tank wagon in private carriage from Roosevelt to Vernal--
a distance of 24 miles. The applicant sought an extension of it's 
contract carrier permit from Roosevelt to Vernal so that it could 
transport directly from Salt Lake City to Vernal in it's larger 
5500 or 7000 gallon semi-trailer tanks. The applicant had a contract 
with Standard Oil Company and the evidence was clear that the traffic 
from Roosevelt to Vernal would not be tendered to the protestants 
under any circumstances and further that if the application were 
denied that Standard Oil would continue to use the private carria~ 
of I. Sander in it's 1400 gallon unit from Roosevelt to Vernal. The 
Commission properly granted the contract carrier permit authorizing an 
extension from Roosevelt to Vernal under the proof required for a 
contract carrier permit pursuant to the above-mentioned statute. 
The distinctions between Cantlay and the instant case are 
so many and apparent that it's application here is clearly error. ~~ 
the burden of proof required to obtain a contract carrier permit is far 
less stringent than that required under Section 54-6-5 U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, to obtain a certificate to operate as a common carrier. Secon~ 
Cantlay did not involve an alternate route. Proof of a need was present: 
Third, the applicant was transporting ill of the traffic involved under 
contract with the shipper and would continue to do so under any circum· 
stance. Fourth, the only effect of granting the application would be 
to decrease the operating costs of the applicant and to decrease t~ 
number of trips between Vernal and Roosevelt by use of the larger 
equipment. Fifth, none of the protestants had ever participated in anJ 
of the traffic involved and the evidence was clear that they would not 
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participa,te in ~~a~ traffi.c in
1 
the. f~t~r;e~. re~ard~~s~. ~f)he action 
of the Commission on,the permit,appljqJ;ion, 
, , 1 _;~ 1' 1 ,: 1· ~-~_)r: ,-~ .-'' 10 ~ lr1 ct:=Js+ 
,r,n .the n~~t,,rar~~rap~ ?Lit;1 ?rger,~th~.co~~is~jo~.H%tes: 
, "Prot~~ta~t~ ,Ri~ Gr~nge.Moto~ Wa.¥s,,~qc: arg4es that+thEl 
· Pubhc Sel"vice Cdmrtdss10H"of'Utal\ 'dltght to b~tbound·by· 
th~ !nter~t~t~ Cqmm~rce Commi}~ion (lOli<;_y,,d~t~rmil,la);iqqs 
on 'r'OU te' devi'atfo~; 1. I't flirt Heit a'rgiles ·that ahf ca'rrrnr 
.. se~ki~g. ,i! ~oy~e-devi.ation mu~tproy~ ,public; conve.11ie9-<;~. 
• 111 antfl1n~cess1tyi·:·'"-·(T. 78}' ,,,r ·JJ<"' · · ·····• ........ · 1 ·1 
·1) Appeflant, 'Rio cGraii'c'l:~; 'fias 'hever rilJct~ 'sclch an iir'guril~nt: 
Appellant~ argued that·goodregcrl~Hon a'ild"Cclmmdn sense i:HEi:~tes 
•tMt t'~e ·&6tnrflfS'sfclff ~'troift!d exahlrRe Dffie1 'de't.Ps f8Rs 9df' 11t~i Cammi ssi on and 
a\iaii11 tfs'e lf c5'f the ;tdrfititlS~lftin e5i jeXpe\!tfs'e 'W'Refe: app't'op~fat~>1 r~ it Is 
''"l ega V imerii~\:lum, •&Jurrs'~l flor 2cllliYel i1ahf2st~lf'~d "r r:; z·isjn I 
r,I c~_~·c ·:_~rnn_2til'15£he¥1~and ~"th~ r Hrtets'tat1e rt·cmuti~~~e Co~rfliJs:g; 8~ !~ 
has_ 'I. mu .. lt.it.ude o1f cases ,cov.1~1i r;ii:i the.,c;,.~i t;e.. r,i a to b~ 2 q •· , · - ' ,, \J~E!& in 'dedid:ill!}l-':C£~t'10¥--fli:i~~.J¥e-.!anEt. the 'Lt:~ 
has.likewise, promulgat:d 'deviation.regula~~o~~· bS .q 
It is respectfully submitted that this Comm1ss1orr 
should ,look to. thf=! r,ul~s }lJ)_d xegula:ttens a,n_ctlpecisions 
!cri'I of''thW t'.t:c':' expe'rfi'Sle 9iti flTis' regai'tl.9 '1 Ttfese rules 
_ . have bee,n apyl_ie,d_ Jllany~ _mat)Y ,times anp hq,V_~ be~ ... - d 
f,' '·1Q9 ·, sew,, cbfi1s1fstent1.Y' 'refii:~rated' ·:as 'the' 1prhifet' 0ch1\'s~1cJNatid1n's0% 
o1r.1 ~''"· ",,;;~~d:{).~~,pP,l,'.'ic2~,t}pC)~;~,.?oif1 ~n)i.s}lan11~~~1::~u~R2° n6olJJ ~~J1ll's'lfsn~sr:l 
' OJ" r 'I ~ai~,G:tfn va·~w 04r tJ1b tt\Vi 2s'al\l/IP7nemb~·w~'lfliln:'3:l5i 2 ,0 i r: I !110'\T 
"We respectfully submit that ttf'~'tlm;1!.Wfi'kc11 %y:lfti1J'. 'lo 
... .. )pt~r~~ate .Com,m)rc_e C,o~mllJ\S,sio!lA~e pa,.s,ect- UJ!0'1, twenty 
.i:t ? 11 · yeitrs of experfente 'ar1C:P HaVe111 wrthWoott' cha'tTunge 
during that peri ~d o'. time and certai.'1}l- ar,eder-*'Sf Pe$.-ler 
and equitable gu1del1nes to be used by:tth~~ -
c:'' C 101~m} 1S1 ~1 ipr';·.i"C• (j<., 1 ~4) 1 Jegi,p~hl~~Sl].~ acd~e3d)1,r,[,s o/:' 
4Ef! 1 2Jf~1Y, ~~t1 "flbh:'fl! 1th,,(i,j1cihb\iti 'lil rJ* btlir3 1rtie1noranda and l ega 1 
,01 ,,,,3rlfll:trw \Ji·2) :1or:lr~svquf11'c·'.! svrJ':i9tr'9 % Jon 
argument ·~t Lt:t1e iw1.:ljdiiftl tnAf'lfl'!:ilf¥m 'tlf~TI f ttfiat it is 1~:1;to ,/.;r-, "1G 2·9unsvs"t bs269"1J9b 10 9219Vbb ",J't 
To cc·?r.,., .,'.d r.orjrLiqmo1 9vrjJUrj2sb To 9Jn9biv9 
Ti11U 'ld 0Jrv>s2 9rlj 10 3J~5rrno119q 9rlJ 
( b9bb6 -~g;_5rlqrn9 l ". 2\',iiHTH::JI371'1 
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While this matter has been covered in part in prior argument, 
we deem it important to point out the misconception on the part of the 
Commission as to the burden of proof. Clearly, based upon authority 
heretofore cited, the burden of proving that applicant is an effective 
competitor is upon the applicant. The applicant failed in this 
burden. It is reversible error for the Commission to shift this burden 
to the protestants. There is no way that the protestants could determine 
how much traffic was handled by the applicant and, therefore, no way 
to determine whether or not the unknown quantity of traffic handled 
by the applicant had any effect whatever upon their existing operations. 
We contend that they were not an effective competitor over the Indian 
Canyon route. 
The first full paragraph on page 3 of the ColllTiission's order 
(R. 79) refers to the Lewis Brothers and Los Angeles and Salt Lake Rail-
road Company Cases. We have no quarrel with the rule of law set forth 
in those cases, namely that the Commission has the duty to exercise 
it's own judgment on the facts. We are here complaining about basic 
and far-reaching errors in law. 
The balance of that paragraph again indicates a misconception 
on the part of the Commission as to the issues involved. It provides: 
"The Public Service Commission is, indeed, not bound by 
the policies of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
determinations on route deviation. In fact, the policy 
for route deviation laid down by this Commission in the 
Palmer Brothers Case 4869 Sub. 1, is indicative of the 
distinct difference between this Commission's policy and 
that of the Interstate Commerce Commission." (emphasis 
added) 
We have indicated our position concerning whether or not the 
Commission is bound by the Interstate Commerce Commission rules and 
we further point out that the policy laid down by the Utah Commission 
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in the Palmer Brothers case is, in fact, identical to that enun · 
c1 ated 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. As indicated in our prior 
discussion of Palmer, the Commission properly found that (l) Palmer 
was operating between the involved termini over a practical and 
feasible route (from Salt Lake City to Provo) and (2) it was an 
effective competitor with existing carriers for the traffic moving 
between those points and that (3) a grant of authority to Palmer would 
not enable it to institute a new service or a service so differe~ f~ 
that presently provided as to improve materially it's competitive 
position. 
We have no quarrel whatever with the rules applied by the 
Commission in Palmer. We do submit, however, that the application of 
those same rules to the petition of respondent, Uintah Freightways, 
compels a conclusion that it's application must be denied. 
In the next two paragraphs of it's order (R. 79) the 
Commission again mis-states the contention of appellant concerning 
proof of public convenience and necessity and clearly shows a mis-
application of Section 54-4-25 U.C.A., as amended, to the subject at 
hand in lieu of Section 54-6-5 U.C.A., as amended. Our position is 
clear that proof of public convenience and necessity is required only 
if an applicant for a route deviations fails to sustain it's burden of 
proving the three basic elements required in such an application. 
The last two full paragraphs on page 3 of it's order (R. 79), 
discussing the application of Sections 54-6-5 and 54-4-25, clearly shll\i 
an erroneous misapplication of the appropriate statutory criteria. 
t" n The Commission lifted from context the following language from Sec 10 
54-4-25: 
-22-
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--
"Provided that this section shall not be construed to 
require any such corporation to secure such certi-
ficate for an extension within any city or town within 
which it shall heretofore lawfully commence operations 
or ... for an extension within or to territory 
already served by it, necessary in the ordinary 
course of its business." (R. 79) · 
We submit that if such language were applicable to app1ic-
tions by motor common carriers for extensions of an existing certificate 
of convenience and necessity that a carrier once certified from point 
A to point B, to serve any type of colllllodity, could enlarge- the 
commodity description and the territorial scopt! of that certificate 
without proof of further public convenience and necessity or proof of an 
alternate route application or any proof·whatever'. 
Clearly Section 54-4-25 has nb application t,o the subject 
matter at hand. That section is entitled 0'CERTfFICATE OF CONVENIE~CE 
AND NECESSITY PREREQUISITE TO CONSTRl:ICTION AND OPERATION!' (emphasH 'added) 
A mere reading of the title and the section, which is too long to 
quote in this brief, clearly shows that it is inapplicable' to ·tH~ factual 
matter being here considered. The ent'ire section applies 'to the" 
construction of physi ca 1 properties"of railroad corporations, street-
rail road corporations, aeri a 1-bucket tramway corpora Hons~ gas corpor-
ations, electric corporations, telephone corporations, telegraph 
corporations, etc., all of which Y.equire the eonstruction of pHY~ical 
plants and facilities in order to• provide service.· 
On the other hand, once an applicant has fail'ed torsatfsf'j 
the three concurrent basic criteria to warrant the grant of an 
alternate route application it must, like any other applicant, be guided 
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by the provisions of Section 54-6-5 relating to the proof required 
to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity. 
CONCLUSION 
The authority issued by the Commission in 1958 in certifi-
cate 1288 was a single grant of authority authorizing service (A) 
between Salt Lake City, Utah and points in the Uintah Basin (B) betwee' 
Vernal, Utah and Price, Utah and (C) between all points in Utah 
authorized in (A) and ( B) on the one hand and a 11 points in Daggett 
County, Utah on the other with restrictions not here pertinent. 
That authority was never intended to and did not, in fact, 
grant respondent authority to provide service between Salt Lake City 
and Price. The attempted "tacking" of the individual paragraphs of 
that separate grant was i 11 ega l and cannot under any circumstances be 
used as the basis for granting additional authority. 
Without basic authority between the two termini there can 
be no alternate route relief. This, alone, compels a denial of the 
app l i ca ti on. However, under any circumstances, respondent has wholly 
failed to meet the three basic concurrent criteria required for an 
alternate route application. 
The Cammi ss ion further misapplied the statutory and case law 
to the factual situation under consideration. Such misapplication 
constitutes serious error in law which, if not remedied, will result in 
irreparable damage to appellant. 
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WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully prays that the Court 
reverse the decision of the Commission and direct it to deny the 
respondent's application. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Mark K. Boyle 
345 S. State, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
RIO GRANDE MOTORWAYS, INC. 
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